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ABSTRACT
A short review of the history of planetary quarantine, the issues
and changes in official advisory groups' pronouncements are presented.
Then a discussion of the current situation and some ideas on how best to
address them are outlined. Both manned and unmanned or automatic
missions are discussed and their advantages and impediments outlined.
The first, and probably the most vexing aspect of this issue is the
insufficiency of data that are both conclusive and relevant. Data are
needed both about the presence (or its historical existence) of life on
Mars, and about the conditions on Mars that may support "foreign" life
forms. As a consequence of this paucity of data, proponents of any one
side of this multlfaceted issue have and will continue to profess the
probity of their beliefs. More, better and germane data will tend to
lessen the intensity of the discussions.
A little background and a review of the history of Mars Planetary
Quarantine will be useful to those unfamiliar wlth the issues. When
exploration of the solar system started to become practical back in the
1960's, there was concern that some terrestrial organisms might be
carried to a planet and thereby establish themselves in their new
environment. Once established on this non-terrestrlal planet or
satellite, it was feared that terrestrial organisms would upset the
natural environment there and destroy or modify it irrevocably. The
subsequent study of such a "contaminated" body would, therefore, become
much more complicated and confusing. This would be especially true if
the objective was the study of extraterrestrial biology. For these
reasons, there was general agreement among scientists that solar system
research should be conducted in ways that virtually precluded earthly
organisms from "contaminating" the target body. This principle was
discussed on an international level by delegates to the Committee on
Space Research (COSPAR). These discussions resulted in a resolution
establishing a criterion of 10-3 chance of contaminating a planet llke
Mars during the period of "biological exploration." The time period of
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"biological exploration" was at first assumed to be 20
recently, the period has been extended to 50 years.
The United States and the Soviet Union approached
differently.
known (or
considered.
cal load"
years. More
the problem
The United States used an analytic approach; that is, all
assumed) factors that could lead to "contamination" were
Some of these factors were: determination of the "biologi-
of a spacecraft (what numbers and kinds of organisms were
launched with the vehicle), detailed assessment of the probability of
survival of the organisms during the flight to the planet and during
entry into the planetary atmosphere, and most important, the probability
of growth (PG) in the organisms' new environment (assuming viable
organisms reach the planetary surface - or atmosphere). Of course, there
was and is, no way to accurately calculate PG" It's estimate was based on
what we knew of the particular solar system body in question, and In the
case of Mars, upon simulation experiments to determine the viability of
terrestrial organisms in the Martian environment. The actual setting of
P6 on Mars was based on a study of all relevant Information available at
the time by the Space Science Board of the National Academy of Science.
For most solar system bodies, the estimate of P6 was so low that the
COSPAR criteria could be met by simply sending a reasonably clean space-
craft. The PG for Mars was estimated to be high enough to require
positive measures to drastically reduce the load at launch. This led to
a requirement that the Viking landers be heat "sterilized", as well as
protected from later contamination during passage through the Earth's
atmosphere.
The Soviet Union implemented the COSPAR resolution by a combination
of heat and chemical "sterilizations", followed by an actual
determination, of a duplicate spacecraft literally ground up and cultured
for all possible organisms. The results claimed to show that no
organisms survived these procedures, and hence, there was no chance to
contaminate Mars (Vashkov, et al., in "Life Sciences and Space Research",
XII, 199, 1974).
NASA has recently developed a new strategy to comply with the COSPAR
guidelines on out-bound spacecraft. At COSPAR's last session, this new
strategy was accepted. This strategy no longer requires an estimate of
P0" The new proposal suggests establishing, a rtp.F__qEi, five categories of
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solar system missions, and for each category indicating what level of
concern exists, and what quarantine measures would be activated for each
category. This determination of categories does not, in my view, change
the fundamental problem; the stipulation of what category and particular
mission will be assigned will be based upon "advice from the scientific
community" (in the United Stated probably the Space Science Board). For
Mars, some sort of collective judgement will still have to be made,
taking into account the planet's "friendliness to terrestrial organisms".
This process of determining a judgement is, essentially, what went into
establishing a PG for Mars in the first place.
What is the current status of our knowledge about the environment on
Mars relative to growth of terrestrial organisms? As the consequence of
a post-Viking assessment of Viking data, the Space Science Board has
reduced the PG for Mars (NASA Publ., "Recommendations on Quarantine
Policy", 1975). These recommendations were largely based upon finding no
detectable organic compounds at the two landing sites (even in a
protected area under a rock); the extremely oxidizing nature of the
surface material; and the very high UV flux at the surface. All these
facts point to an extremely harsh environment for living organisms from
Earth. A note of caution however, viable cocci (bacteria) were brought
back in Surveyor equipment by the Apollo 12 crew after several years on
the Moon. The environment on the Moon is considered to be far more
severe than that of Marsl It would be relatively easy to agree that
some terrestrial organisms might survive (not necessarily reproduce) for
a long time in some protected niche on, or in, Mars. As an extension of
this line of reasoning, most scientists probably would agree the chances
of terrestrial organisms eventually growing on Mars is exceedingly low,
but their growth cannot be ruled out. If one must be sure of no growth,
we would introduce no organisms into the atmosphere, and especially onto
the surface of Mars.
What then are the quarantine issues of landing people on Mars?
Assume the landing would accur prior to obtaining any relevant and
substantially new Martian data. For example, data from the proposed
MGCCO mission would alter thinking on this matter by providing a more
detailed understanding of the water budget on Mars.
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Two or more decades from now, will anyone care whether Mars is
contaminated with terrestrial organisms? Almost certainly! While there
appears to be a lessening in the fervor of those concerned wlth this
problem, when the time comes, they will probably make an issue of any
contamination. Some scientists, truly interested in comparative planeto-
logy, will not want to take the risk of introducing terrestrial organisms
into the Mars environment. Finally, there will still be open the most
fundamental questions, to laymen and scientists alike, of whether indige-
nous life exists on, or in, Mars. Scientists will probably attempt to
insist on an exhaustive test of this idea, and to do so without
introducing terrestrial organisms into the environment, assuming none
will have been introduced prior to the manned mission.
In order to eliminate or to minimize the risks of contamination of
Mars by a manned mission to that planet, should that be our policy, two
approaches are available. First is absolute contalnment of all
terrestrial biology while at Nars, and second is obtaining the requisite
information prior to sending people. In principle, it would be possible
to provide adequate technologies to achieve the former. People do work
with very dangerous and highly infectious agents on Earth. An entire
technology has been developed to contain these agents. Using a
"sterilized" lander (as done with Viking), with adequate filter, vents,
pressure regulators, etc., to prevent the escape of spacecraft
atmospheric particulars upon human egress and during EVA on Mars. The
EVA systems could not leak, as do all current systems. All this would be
terribly expensive, but in the long run it may be the only sure approach
and it will work only if no failures occur. An intermediate approach
would be the use of automated or telepresent devices in place of the
humans. The people might be kept in orbit or in a sterilized lander.
The rovers and science instruments would, of course, all be sterilized.
Since people on or near Mars are going to have to carry their own llfe
support systems with them (either as spacecraft, EVA suits, landers,
rovers, etc.) the design of all such systems have to incorporate this
very stringent specification.
The second approach to helping eliminate the risk of contaminating
Mars is fraught with serious difficulties. Prior to sending people to
the surface, we must obtain the necessary information to assure that
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contamination cannot occur. In the past, many investigators have
performed simulations to determine if organisms can grow in the Martian
environment, both in the United States and in the Soviet Union. These
efforts have shown the UV flux on Mars was the single most potent delete-
rious agent to terrestrial organisms. It could always be argued that
almost any thin layer of shielding material could protect terrestrial
organisms, even on Mars. In this connection, it may be of some use to
again consider simulation studies. These should be done in the light of
Viking data from Mars (e.g., if there is actually no organic material in
the Martian environment, which terrestrlal organisms could posslbly main-
tain themselves there? What would they eat? If they were photos_nthe-
tic, how could they obtain their radiant energy while protected from the
UV, etc.?) Some in-depth studies might be useful when the time comes to
place a Mars mission into one of the five NASA planetary quarantine
categories. In this regard, more information about what makes the Mar-
tian "soil" could be extremely useful. We do not know which, if any,
nltrogen-contalnlng compounds are in the surface material. If all the
nitrogen on Mars is in the atmosphere, this would drastically reduce the
kinds of terrestrial organisms that could grow there to a few species of
blue-green algae and bacteria. What is the nature and distribution of
the postulated oxidizing matter on Mars? As mentioned above, a thorough
knowledge of where the water is on Mars, and what translocations of water
occur would help immensely in putting limits on the prospects of
contaminating Mars.
For these and similar reasons, the more information about Mars that
can be obtained on precursor missions the easier the design specification
for the manned missions would be. A series of carefully thought-through
precursor missions designed to glean data to better assess the proba-
bility of contaminating Mars would probably be money and talent well
spent. In the final analysis, it must be recognized that all data
collected about Mars will serve for ever more accurate analytic
assessment of whether or not terrestrial organisms can survive, and grow
on Mars, thereby "contaminating" it.
In the end, the best case that can be made to allay the concerns of
whose who would protect Mars from terrestrial organisms will be the
design of a system that contains all terrestrial organisms. It is quite
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certain that analytic methods will never give the confidence that well-
developed systems and carefully thought-through procedures will give.
The pragmatic issue will ultimately be a weighing of the costs versus
some ill-defined confidence level. It seems this sort of trade is the
forte of NASA and its associated "advisors."
$
Many of the ideas and issues in this paper are taken from the work
of H. P. Klein. His help in formulating the positions taken herein are
appreciated by the author.
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